United States v. Daniel J. Valdez — CAAF (Oct 6, 2026)
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces considers an Army sergeant's appeal over a prolonged delay after his court-martial. In 2022, he was convicted of leaving his unit without permission, disrespect toward superiors, and battery upon his wife. His sentence was reduction by one rank and thirty days of hard labor without confinement. His case did not reach the Army Court of Criminal Appeals until 952 days after the trial ended, including 736 days after judgment was entered. The government agreed that the extraordinary delay warranted setting aside his sentence. The Army Court nevertheless affirmed his convictions and sentence. Article sixty-six, D, two, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows a military appeals court to grant appropriate relief for excessive delay after entry of judgment. The questions are how this Court should review that decision, and whether he should receive relief. De novo means deciding anew, without deferring to the lower court's answer. Abuse-of-discretion review is more deferential: it requires more than a different view, such as an arbitrary or unreasonable decision. Major Kelsey Mowatt-Larssen, an Army judge advocate, will seek sentence relief, contending that the Army Court failed to address the excessive delay.
United States v. Daniel J. Valdez (No. 26-0122/AR) — United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, argued October 6, 2026.
- 0:00Introduction
- 18:42Advocate — Andrew Bobowski